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Introduction 
The inexorable rise in global deaths from tobacco is increasingly 
driven by trends in low and middle income countries (LMICs)1 where, 
by 2030, it is estimated that 6.8 million of the 8.3 million tobacco-
related deaths will occur.2 The changing global patterns of tobacco use 
that underpin these mortality trends reflect the presence and actions 
of the tobacco industry, whose role in expanding tobacco use 
globally,3–5 has led to its label as the vector of the tobacco epidemic. 
In recognition that the factors driving the tobacco epidemic, 
notably the actions of the tobacco industry, transcend national 
borders, the World Health Organization (WHO) used its treaty making 
powers for the first time in developing the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC). Given overwhelming evidence of the tobacco 
industry’s efforts to subvert public health policy making,6 the treaty 
includes Article 5.3, which requires parties to protect their public 
health policies from the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”.7 
The FCTC, which is legally binding, entered into force in 2005 and, by 
December 2014, 180 of the UN’s 193 member states were Parties to 
the Treaty. Yet FCTC implementation has been slow and uneven in 
large part because of tobacco industry efforts to subvert progress in 
tobacco control.8 
This paper provides an overview of tobacco industry practices 
focusing on LMICs given (a) the growing importance of LMICs to the 
tobacco industry’s future, (b) the increasing tobacco-related disease 
burden faced by LMICs9 which will increase the policy priority afforded 
to this issue, and (c) the potential, through effective tobacco control 
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policy implementation, to prevent full escalation of the tobacco 
epidemic, particularly in Africa. As well as exploring tobacco industry 
market expansion tactics and policy influence generally, we examine in 
detail three mechanisms through which tobacco companies are 
increasingly attempting to prevent progress in tobacco control - the 
use of international economic agreements, litigation and the illicit 
trade in tobacco. Tobacco companies are also exploiting the 
opportunities presented by harm reduction10,11 and regulatory 
developments such as Better Regulation to enhance their influence12,13 
but these currently have less resonance in LMICs and are not, 
therefore, covered in detail. Finally, we outline how these problems 
might be addressed and highlight that, despite the egregious examples 
of industry influence detailed, some LMICS are exemplars in tobacco 
control and show what can be achieved by prioritising health over 
tobacco industry interests.14 
The Tobacco Industry and Market Expansion 
The importance of LMICS 
Tobacco industry conduct can be understood in the context of 
the global tobacco market and the growing importance of and 
opportunities presented by LMICs. Historically western based tobacco 
companies expanded their global sales by using investment and trade 
liberalisation to enter new markets and acquire smaller companies – 
Latin America in the 1970s, parts of Asia in the 1980s and the former 
communist bloc in the 1990s.4,5 So assiduous was this expansion that 
the global industry is now dominated by just four privately owned 
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) - Philip Morris International, 
British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and 
Imperial Tobacco(Table w1).15 While TTCs persistently seek to make 
inroads into the world’s largest and most rapidly growing market, 
China (Figure 1), it remains dominated by the state owned Chinese 
National Tobacco Company (CNTC), the world’s largest tobacco 
company by volume, which has fiercely guarded TTCs’ access16 and is 
instead emerging as a competitor, producing brands for export to 
South East Asia.17 Beyond this, there are now very few additional 
state-owned or private companies left to acquire (Table w1). 
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Figure 1. Cigarette consumption (millions of sticks) by region (historic and forecast 
data on retail volumes), 1998–2017. 
Source: Euromonitor data downloaded 7th May 2014 
Consequently, the TTCs’ future now depends on driving 
consumption and stretching profit margins in existing markets. With 
China largely closed to TTCs and consumption falling in most high 
income countries (HIC), Latin America and Eastern Europe, their main 
opportunities for driving consumption arise through promoting 
smoking in the hitherto underexploited markets of Asia Pacific, Africa 
and the Middle East, where consumption continues to increase (Figure 
1).15 The greatest potential lies in Africa where the largest increases in 
smoking prevalence are predicted.18 Population growth15 and the 
burgeoning number of adolescents consequent to declining childhood 
mortality rates9 further enhance the attractiveness of LMICs. So too do 
the limited opportunities elsewhere. In HICs, the TTCs have been able 
to increase profits despite declining sales19 by overshifting taxes 
(increasing prices over and above a tobacco excise increase)20. Yet this 
practice, on which TTCs’ share prices depend, looks increasingly 
threatened.21 Finally, the opportunities e-cigarettes present may be 
more limited than some had assumed - sales growth in HICs is already 
slowing22 and profits on e-cigarettes remain lower than on cigarettes 
with sales accounting for just 0.4% of total value in the combined, 
global nicotine and tobacco market in 2013.21 Further, evidence 
suggests that the tobacco industry may simply seek to harness the 
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reputational and access benefits of e-cigarettes while constraining 
their ability to genuinely compete with cigarettes.10,11 This is supported 
by media reports that tobacco companies are arguing for greater 
regulation of more innovative (refillable tank) e-cigarette products 
than cig-a-like products.23 
Market Expansion 
The tobacco industry’s aggressive approach to market 
expansion has been widely documented and shown to drive rapid 
increases in tobacco use.3–5,24,25 Historic evidence shows that to drive 
up sales they market heavily, sell cheaply, systematically flaunt 
existing tobacco control policies and prevent future policies by 
lobbying aggressively.4,26–32 While such strategies are best documented 
in HICs, Latin America, parts of Asia and the former Eastern bloc, it is 
clear they are being repeated worldwide (Boxes 1 and 2).33–36 
Box 1 
Tobacco Industry Expansion into Emerging Markets: Targeting 
Women and Children 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapidly expanding young population and 
blossoming middle class makes it a prime target for tobacco industry 
expansion and tobacco companies have been strategically targeting 
the largely untapped opportunities there. 
Historical corporate documents indicate that the sale of single stick 
cigarettes, which continues to this day and makes smoking affordable 
and accessible particularly for the poor and young, underpins industry 
expansion in Africa33,42,43 and efforts to ban their sale have been 
contested and circumvented.44,45 Numerous other efforts are made to 
market cigarettes to youth. In many African countries children aged 
13–15 are frequently offered free cigarettes by tobacco company 
representatives.46 Recent reports document companies marketing 
candy-cigarettes near schools,42 and sponsoring youth-oriented 
concerts and events.47 Indirectly, youth promotion is also achieved 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities such as publicly 
donating sickle cell anaemia screening machines in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo48 where many children are affected by the disease, 
and sponsoring the education of hundreds of children in Uganda. 49 
Marketing to women and girls who, in LMICs, have lower rates of 
smoking than men, is also widespread.50,51 Efforts include using ‘trend 
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setters’ to promote and normalise the image of the African woman 
smoker (see below) in an attempt to mollify the cultural barriers to 
female smoking. The industry’s success is evidenced by the rising 
uptake of smoking in girls in many developing parts of the world.24 
 
 
Congo Tobacco Company Celebration of Women in Goma, Eastern 
DRC, on Women’s Day, March 8 2012 
Box 2 
Tobacco Industry Influence in Emerging Markets: preventing, 
stalling and circumventing legislation in Africa 
Progress in tobacco control in Africa has been significantly hindered by 
tobacco industry interference. In Kenya, it took over 13 years for the 
Tobacco Control Act 2007 to be approved by Parliament and Namibia’s 
Tobacco Products Control Act, initially introduced in the early 1990s, 
was not passed until 2010. These delays were attributed in large part 
to industry interference.33,84 In Nigeria, where tobacco control NGOs 
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have pushed for limitations on tobacco industry involvement in policy-
making, BAT Nigeria ran a full page advert in a July 2014 issue of The 
Guardian (Nigerian) attempting to undermine the NGOs by informing 
the public of the “aggressive propaganda against the Tobacco 
Industry” and claiming the industry had contributed to stronger 
tobacco control there and therefore “must be part of the solution”.85 In 
Uganda, where the Tobacco Control Bill was tabled in 2014, BAT 
claimed that the bill, although having little impact on demand for leaf 
which is almost entirely exported,86 would decimate the livelihoods of 
over 14,000 farmers with negative economic consequences.87 BAT 
initially cancelled their contracts with the 709 tobacco farmers from 
the constituency represented by the mover of the bill and later 
announced they would no longer contract any tobacco farmers in 
Uganda.45,87 While BAT has now blamed the bill for these decisions, it 
had previously cited the unpredictability of the tobacco crop in Uganda 
as the primary reason for withdrawal, while its 2013 closure of a leaf 
processing plant, relocated to Kenya, hinted that the company had 
been planning its exit for several years. 
Even once legislation is passed, the tobacco industry finds innovative 
ways to circumvent it. For example, in Kenya mandated health 
warnings on cigarette packages are often applied as removable 
stickers.33 In Nigeria, BAT has been accused of misleading senior 
police staff on the definition of “public places” in order to prevent 
enforcement of smoke-free legislation.88 In Namibia, BAT used legal 
intimidation to prevent implementation of the 2010 Act.84 
Marketing 
Despite tobacco industry claims that it markets only to existing 
smokers to encourage brand switching, historical industry documents 
make it abundantly clear that they have deliberately targeted non-
smokers, notably young people and women, and that their future 
depends on driving smoking uptake among these groups.24 For 
example, as one executive explained “[T]he base of our business is the 
high school student”,37 while BAT’s marketing plans for its brand 
Players Gold Leaf referred to targeting those aged “16+” and of “low 
income low literacy”.38 
The industry’s targeting of women in HICs dates back to the 
1920s and linked smoking to emancipation, selling cigarettes as 
‘torches of freedom’.24,39 Consequently the gender gap in smoking 
narrowed in most HICs, parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe, yet 
elsewhere, particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, smoking 
among women remains considerably lower than men.40 Such tactics 
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have, therefore, now been repeated worldwide with the industry 
capitalising on social and economic change by using marketing to 
make female smoking more socially acceptable (Box 1).24,39,41 
Evidence indicates a causal relationship between tobacco 
advertising and smoking initiation, and that even brief exposure to 
advertising has an impact on adolescents.52 The high levels of 
marketing observed across LMICs53,54 is therefore of major concern. 
For example, large numbers of children report being given free 
cigarettes by tobacco company representatives while the vast majority 
(between 35% and 97% by country) of professional respondents in 
schools believe the tobacco industry deliberately encourages youth to 
use tobacco.53 
Price 
Price/tax increases are the most effective means of reducing 
tobacco use.55 A key industry tactic in emerging markets, used as part 
of its aggressive approach to driving up sales, is to keep prices cheap 
in order to encourage uptake and establish use.15,56,57 Given the 
oligopolistic nature of most tobacco markets, only in some instances 
are such practices driven by genuine price competition.55 Dumping, 
price discounting, absorbing taxes rather than passing them onto 
smokers, using smuggling to avoid taxes (see below) and lobbying to 
keep tobacco taxes low have all been documented as elements of such 
a strategy.4,56,57 BAT has referred to this approach as “share at all 
costs market dynamics”.15 Once smoking uptake, tobacco sales and 
disposable incomes have increased sufficiently, the industry increases 
prices or encourages consumers to trade up to more expensive brands 
with larger profit margins; the aim as one PMI document explains, “to 
trade consumers up to premium brands as economies develop”.56 
Thereafter, as companies become more established in these 
markets, the extent of price competition weakens, enabling pricing 
above competitive levels and generating excess profits.19,55 Evidence 
from as far afield as Ireland, UK, US, Jamaica and South Africa 
suggests that tobacco companies then begin to overshift taxes, ie 
increases prices on top of tax rises, at least on premium brands.20,55 
This enables them to both increase profits and pretend that the 
government, through tax increases, is solely responsible for the price 
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rise.55 Simultaneously they lobby for low tobacco taxes, arguing inter 
alia that price rises drive illicit trade. 58,59 Given that the industry itself 
is responsible for a significant proportion of the price increase, such 
arguments defy logic.20,59 What the industry is effectively appealing for 
is lower taxes so that it has greater scope to increase prices (and 
profits).20,59 This pattern, and the excess profits enjoyed by tobacco 
companies in such markets,19 instead signal scope for governments to 
further increase tobacco taxes, an opportunity that is frequently 
overlooked.20,59 Where governments have increased taxes, 
consumption has fallen and tax revenue increased simultaneously.55 
More detailed analysis shows that, while the overall pattern in 
established markets is one of overshifting, the tobacco industry 
simultaneously absorbs the tax increases on its cheapest brands to 
ensure their real price remains steady or even falls.20 These cheap 
brands appear to perform two functions – they provide a route into the 
market for price-sensitive (young) smokers and keep price sensitive 
(poorer) smokers in the market.20 Such efforts are combined with 
price-based marketing which has increased in importance consequent 
to restrictions on other forms of marketing and is also targeted at the 
least well off.60 Collectively they undermine the intended impact of 
tobacco tax policy and are likely to explain inequalities in smoking 
rates.20 
Influencing Policy 
Political Influence in LMICs 
The evidence, including systematic reviews of tobacco industry 
political activity, indicates that tobacco companies predominantly use 
the same tactics and arguments repeatedly over time and across 
jurisdictions.34,58,61 Consequently, the existing literature, despite its 
predominant focus on HICs, can be used to anticipate and, therefore, 
counter industry activities elsewhere.34 The evidence also suggests 
some differences in approach, most notably that efforts to influence 
health policy in LMICs are bolder and, where possible, take advantage 
of state incapacity and corruption.41,62 
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Overall tobacco companies continue to place considerable 
emphasis on economic arguments, rely heavily on third parties, and 
use litigation aggressively to weaken and prevent public health 
measures.6,14,34,58,61,63 However, they have also adapted techniques to 
take account of both challenges to their political legitimacy, now 
formalised in Article 5.3 of the FCTC, and the opportunities presented 
by globalisation. For example, in response to their declining political 
legitimacy, they have increased their use of third parties64,65 and 
attempted to signify a commitment to the public good by rebranding 
their political activities as corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives66–69 and exploiting the political opportunities presented by 
harm reduction.10,11 In response to globalisation, tobacco companies 
are now actively using economic agreements and the opportunities 
presented by the global trade in illicit tobacco products to undermine 
progress in tobacco control. As outlined below, both efforts restrict 
informed scrutiny to experts - international lawyers or experts in illicit 
tobacco - and particularly threaten countries without the financial 
means to mount a legal defence or independently investigate the illicit 
tobacco trade and industry involvement therein. 
Misrepresenting the Costs and Benefits of Tobacco 
Control 
The tobacco industry tends to underplay the potential benefits of 
proposed policies while emphasising their costs.34,70 Consequently, 
despite the important work of the World Bank showing both the limited 
economic dependence of LMICs on tobacco and substantial economic 
benefits of tobacco control,71 the industry continues to exploit 
policymakers’ misconceptions of the economic importance of tobacco, 
limited knowledge of the socio economic benefits of tobacco control 
and short-term interests in revenue generation..29,70,72,73 
Its ability to do this is underpinned by efforts to shape 
understanding of the economic impacts of tobacco through the 
production of lopsided assessments of the economic benefits of 
tobacco designed to create what, in most cases, is a false choice 
between health and economic well-being.74–80 These reports highlight 
foreign exchange earnings, public revenue and employment associated 
with tobacco production (agriculture and manufacturing) and use 
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(retail and hospitality), providing a foundation for alliance building with 
tobacco supply chain workers.79,80 Predictably, however, they ignore 
the economic and social costs associated with tobacco use and 
growing, the fact that money not spent on tobacco will be spent on 
other goods generating alternative employment and public revenue,71 
and the potential for tobacco farmers, with targeted support, to 
diversify.81 
A key audience for such efforts is non-health ministries, whose 
support is crucial to tobacco companies.14,63,82 Recent evidence from 
Vietnam indicates that concerns over unemployment and public and 
private debt in LMICs create a particularly receptive policy 
environment for industry arguments: officials from departments with 
interests in revenue generation took a “politics-as-usual” approach to 
tobacco control, characterised by a low priority for health reform and 
interdepartmental rivalry.73 This reinforces past studies focusing on 
African and Western Pacific countries.29,63 
Such efforts appear to enjoy particular influence in tobacco leaf-
growing countries (Box 2).29 Yet, it is increasingly apparent that much 
of the industry’s argumentation on tobacco farming is misleading.81 
Claims that tobacco control measures in leaf-growing nations will 
suddenly decimate tobacco farming when the majority of the crop is 
exported and reductions in local consumption will be small and gradual 
are simply not credible.81 The vast majority of LMICs are not 
dependent on tobacco farming71 and economically sustainable 
alternatives have been identified in various world regions.81 While their 
application may be complex in some countries, perhaps particularly 
Malawi and Zimbabwe, the only two heavily dependent on tobacco for 
foreign earnings,71 continued dependence on tobacco also reflects 
political choices. By refusing to sign the FCTC, countries like Malawi 
have cut themselves adrift from international efforts to find 
alternatives to tobacco through FCTC Articles 17 and 18. Government 
inertia may also be explained by the dead hand of economic conflicts 
of interest; Malawi has many high-ranking government officials who 
grow tobacco.83 Serious concerns are also being raised about the 
industry’s treatment of tobacco farmers, with bonded labour and child 
labour key issues.81 In the absence of competition, tobacco companies 
have control over leaf grading and price, and can lock farmers into a 
repetitive cycle of debt in exchange for supplies.29,33 Consequently, 
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tobacco farmers are increasingly supporting tobacco control and 
diversification efforts. In Uganda, for example, a group of farmers who 
had switched to growing alternative crops recently submitted a petition 
to the Speaker of the Parliament in support of the Uganda Tobacco 
Control Bill 2014, stating that “Tobacco growing is tantamount to 
making a contract with poverty.” 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
CSR is increasingly central to the tobacco industry’s business 
strategy, yet what appears under the rubric of this ill-defined term 
indicates that CSR is aimed at maintaining their status as political 
insiders with a legitimate role to play within health policymaking.15,66–68 
BAT documents indicate that these considerations have driven its CSR 
programmes from the outset:  
“The approach should succeed in hauling us closer to a position of co-
operation with governments and other important stakeholders in the 
developed world, while helping to limit the spread of “demonisation” 
from the developed world to the emerging markets..”89 
CSR practices work politically by either facilitating conventional 
political activities (by generating goodwill amongst policymakers, for 
instance, charitable donations work to make access to political élites 
more likely) or creating alternative means of putting conventional 
political activities, such as constituency building and political access, 
into effect.,14,67–69,90,91 Many initiatives do both by exploiting LMICs’ 
acute need for investment in social projects. Thus, BAT sponsored 
community water projects and PMI sponsored education projects in 
tobacco farming areas of Sri Lanka, East Africa and Colombia, for 
example, build and maintain alliances with farming communities while 
simultaneously emphasising the value of the industry to social and 
economic development.67,92 This is taken to extreme lengths by 
aligning industry charitable donations with governments’ objectives of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals in, for example, Nigeria 
and Brazil.67,93,94 Given the practice of LMICs defending tobacco on the 
basis of poverty alleviation and development, such approaches 
promise to be highly effective.95 Certainly, internal industry documents 
claim such activities enabled them to prevent advertising bans in 
Sierra Leone and Uganda, and to weaken a tobacco bill in Kenya.96 
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Tobacco industry CSR programmes’ underlying narrative of co-
operation and commitment to “sensible” regulation97 also provide a 
political lubricant for the industry’s other activities including the 
partnerships they are attempting to establish on illicit tobacco (see 
below). In Ecuador, for example, companies gained acceptance into 
policymaking networks by emphasising a commitment to regulation 
under the FCTC but then using the position to push for weak legislative 
proposals.72,75,98 These are designed to have a limited effect on 
tobacco consumption and, by filling regulatory space, decrease the 
likelihood of tobacco legislation being strengthened in the 
future.72,99,100 Continued industry demands to be part of national 
governments’ efforts to develop tobacco legislation97,101,102 underline 
the ongoing risk that such efforts pose to FCTC implementation. A 
similar strategy involves voluntarily introducing weak versions of FCTC 
measures with a view to preventing or delaying the implementation of 
comprehensive ones. In the mid-2000s, BAT increased the size of 
weak, text-only warnings on cigarette packs in Colombia, Honduras, 
Costa Rica, and Trinidad & Tobago, it then taking several years for 
these countries to eventually approve legislation mandating health 
warnings aligned with Article 11 Guidelines.103 
Constituency Building and Third Parties 
The tobacco industry makes extensive use of third parties to 
influence health policy in LMICs.34,61,75 Third party advocacy carries 
greater weight with policy élites,104 colours policymakers’ perceptions 
of the political risks associated with public health measures, and 
amplifies tobacco industry messaging about the negative impacts of 
policy, not least because news outlets frequently fail to expose the 
underlying financial conflicts of interest.105 Different organisations are 
used to manage different aspects of the regulatory environment. 
International business organisations, such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce and US-ASEAN Business Council,106 are used to lobby 
officials on the legal and economic implications of public health 
measures. For example, in 2013 and 2014 when Jamaica and Ireland, 
respectively, were legislating on tobacco packaging (Jamaica 
mandated pictorial health warnings covering 75% of the pack while 
Ireland aims to introduce standardised packaging of tobacco products), 
the US Chamber of Commerce wrote to both governments claiming the 
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measures would contravene intellectual property obligations under 
international trade and investment agreements.107,108 The International 
Tax and Investment Center (ITIC), which describes itself as an 
independent clearinghouse for best practices in taxation is, as 
acknowledged on its website, sponsored by all four TTCs, which are 
also represented on its Board of Directors.109 It hosts seminars, 
publishes reports, and sponsors conferences on tobacco tax policy and 
the illicit tobacco trade which promote the tobacco industry’s position 
on these issues and give it “a seat at the policy-making table”.109 Such 
tactics have proved successful in influencing tax policies in some 
countries.109 In October 2014 it hosted a meeting for finance ministers 
the day before the FCTC Conference of the Parties meeting (COP) in 
Moscow where FCTC Article 6 guidelines on tobacco taxation were to 
be agreed.109 Clearly intended to threaten progress of the guidelines, 
ITIC billed the event as a pre-COP meeting giving the impression that 
it was officially associated with the COP. This prompted WHO to write 
to all parties explaining that the meeting “is in no manner supported 
by the Convention Secretariat and cannot be considered as being in 
any way linked to the COP”.110 
The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) was 
established and continues to be funded by the industry as a “front” for 
its “Third World lobby activities”.82,111 ITGA presents itself as the voice 
of the tobacco farmer in contemporary tobacco policy conflicts.112 Its 
financial links to tobacco companies are rarely disclosed111,112 although 
it is increasingly clear they use ITGA strategically to oppose tobacco 
control policies.82 Farmers are mobilised using misleading arguments 
about the impacts of policies82 and encouraged to intervene using a 
variety of means, including protests, media outreach, policy 
submissions and promotion of research, to highlight the negative 
economic impacts of public health measures.112,113 The tobacco 
industry has even managed to have ITGA oppose FCTC Articles 17 and 
18 which aim to help farmers by finding viable alternatives to tobacco 
growing.82 Recently, civil society organisations and farmers groups in 
Africa have launched a campaign highlighting the ITGA’s lack of 
credibility and independence.114 
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The use of international trade and investment 
agreements and domestic litigation to deter and 
challenge progress in tobacco control 
The tobacco industry is increasingly using international trade 
and investment agreements, including those overseen by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO),115,116 and domestic litigation34,61 to 
challenge existing and deter future tobacco control policies.115,116 
Use of trade and investment agreements  
Industry documents suggest argument that innovative health 
warning policies including standardised packaging contravened trade 
and investment treaties was developed as a deliberate strategy in the 
1990s.115 Despite consistent legal advice that the agreements then in 
existence did not offer protection, the industry successfully used these 
arguments to deter policy implementation.115 With the growing number 
of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties including the emerging 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the 
EU and US and Transpacific Partnership (TPP), involving 12 countries 
and approximately 40% of world trade, this trend looks set to 
intensify. Moreover, given changes in the nature of such agreements 
and evidence of industry efforts to influence their content in ways that 
make it easier to challenge policies, these agreements may now pose 
even greater challenges to tobacco control.116–118 Key concerns are 
that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) enhance intellectual property 
rights and, in contrast to most current major economic agreements 
which only allow governments to lodge formal complaints, give 
corporations legal standing to directly challenge governments’ 
regulation though investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
arrangements. ISDS arbitration can be costly and uncertain and grants 
compensation (not sanctioned retaliation, like in the WTO), thereby 
significantly increasing the financial risks to countries facing such 
disputes.116,117 
Although corporations are unable to directly bring a case to 
WTO, certain LMIC governments appear willing to act as tobacco 
industry puppets. Currently, five countries – Ukraine (DS434), 
Honduras (DS435), the Dominican Republic (DS441), Cuba (DS458) 
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and Indonesia (DS467) – are complainants in a formal WTO dispute 
against Australia’s standardised packaging legislation. These countries, 
alongside other (predominantly leaf-producing) LMICs, also challenged 
Australia for many months before the formal dispute within WTO 
committees119 and expressed concerns about the European Union’s 
Tobacco Product’s Directive when notified to the WTO in 2013.120 
Similar countries, Malawi among them, continue to vocally challenge 
other’ tobacco control measures in the WTO including bans on tobacco 
additives Canada and Brazil.121,122 
These disputes are rarely genuinely about trade. They are rather 
about the threat that regulation poses to tobacco companies and their 
ability to convince governments to challenge such innovation on their 
behalf. In the case of standardised packs in Australia, the 
complainants’ do not export large volumes of tobacco products to 
Australia, if at all.123 Instead, PMI or BAT funding for four of the five 
claims against Australia has been acknowledged.124,125 In Malawi, the 
tobacco industry is thoroughly integrated into official international 
trade policymaking – it plays leadership roles on the National Working 
Group on Trade Policy and the Private-Public Dialogue Forum.126,127 
While the tobacco industry is clearly adept at cultivating strong 
political ties in countries where tobacco growing is widespread, it is 
also apparent that they take advantage of poor governance and 
corruption: 18 of the 27 countries that directly challenged Canada’s 
ban on tobacco additives scored in the corrupt or highly corrupt range 
on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and 
only 3 in the “Clean” range.128 
LMICs have also been the victims of industry efforts to use 
economic treaties to threaten innovative tobacco control policies both 
historically129,130 and recently. Uruguay is currently defending its large, 
graphic warning labels in international arbitration.131 PMI (with 2013 
revenues of more than US$59 billion and profits near $9 billion132) 
claims that Uruguay (with total budget revenues of approximately $17 
billion and expenditures of $19 billion133) is violating the provisions of 
a BIT that the country has with Switzerland (PMI’s corporate home), 
even though Article 2.1 of the BIT clearly provides for a public health 
exception.134 Without an international NGO, Bloomberg Philanthropies, 
supporting its legal costs, Uruguay would likely have abandoned its 
regulatory efforts.135 
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Use of Domestic Litigation  
Tobacco companies are aggressive litigants, bringing legal 
challenges even when their own advisers indicate that action is likely 
to fail,136 and reports suggest a fourfold increase in tobacco industry 
litigation against public health measures between 2005 and 2011.137 
Such challenges seek to delay, overturn or weaken (allowing, for 
example, smoking in ventilated areas or limiting the size of health 
warnings (Box 3))138 public health measures. Amongst other 
measures, proposals in LMICs to increase the size of health warnings 
(Thailand,139 Sri Lanka,140,141 Nepal142) and introduce graphic health 
warnings (Paraguay,143 Philippines1,144), and restrictions on public 
smoking (Uganda,138 Kenya,138 Mexico,79,145 Argentina,1,146 Brazil1), 
marketing (South Africa,138,140 Panama,1 Colombia1, Brazil1), and 
additives (Brazil147–149) have all recently been challenged in national 
courts. Interestingly, many of these cases fail,1,138,140– 142,150–152 
reflecting a similar pattern in Europe.1,136,140 Given the frequency with 
which court challenges are made and the breadth of measures that 
have been subject to legal challenge, the number of informal threats of 
litigation to policymakers that never come to light but may have 
deterred progress in tobacco control is likely to be significant.34 
Box 3 
BAT’s efforts to challenge health warning legislation in Sri 
Lanka 
In August 2012 the Sri-Lankan Ministry of Health passed regulations 
requiring pictorial health warning covering 80% of the front and back 
of tobacco packs and in February 2014, the Sri-Lankan parliament 
approved legislation to this end. Meanwhile, however, Ceylon Tobacco 
Company (CTC), a BAT subsidiary, has brought a series of legal 
challenges against the legislation that have led ultimately to a 
significant delay in implementation and a shrinking in size of the 
warnings to 60%. 
The initial lawsuit claimed the regulations were impossible to 
implement, the company would only comply if the requirements were 
“reasonable” (35% of the pack surface) and that the Ministry of Health 
did not have the authority to issue such regulations. The case went 
through several layers of the court system which at one point 
suggested that both parties settle with the Ministry of Health reducing 
the size of the warnings, a suggestion it refused, until CTC ultimately 
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filed the case in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court first delayed 
implementation of the warnings before ruling, in May 2014, that the 
Ministry of Health had the right to impose the health warnings but 
ordered a reduction in size to between 50–60% of the pack surface. 
The new warnings were due to be in place by July 1st 2014 but, just 
two weeks before that, CTC filed a further appeal with the Supreme 
Court requesting a 10–11 months extension to the date of 
implementation for the company to sell already available stocks. On 
July 11th 2014 a final ruling has delayed the 60% pictorial health 
warnings until January 1 2015. 
Sources:141,153 
Tobacco smuggling 
The availability of cheap, illicit tobacco undermines attempts to 
reduce tobacco use and is a public health concern which has prompted 
the inclusion of an Illicit Trade Protocol within the FCTC. Yet a far 
greater concern is the way the tobacco industry is increasingly 
manipulating the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain in ways 
that seriously threaten progress in tobacco control. Tobacco companies 
make their profit when they sell to the distributor and whether the 
cigarettes are then sold through legal or illegal channels makes little 
difference. However, the sale of cigarettes through illegal channels has 
a number of advantages for tobacco companies (Web Box 1). Despite 
overwhelming evidence of the industry’s historical involvement in 
cigarette smuggling (Web Box 1) and growing evidence of ongoing 
complicity, for example through over-producing or over-supplying 
markets with product that then leaks into illicit channels,154–156 tobacco 
companies have managed to shift the illicit tobacco issue from a public 
relations disaster in which they were identified as the pariah supplier 
of illicit product157,158 to a public relations success story in which they 
are increasingly perceived as the victim of and solution to the problem. 
Through their assiduous efforts over recent years, tobacco companies 
have effectively hijacked the Illicit Trade Protocol (Box 4) and are 
actively using the threat of illicit to counter tobacco control policies by 
arguing, misleadingly, that tobacco control policies drive increases in 
illicit.58,59,159,160 
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Box 4 
The tobacco industry’s ongoing attempts to infiltrate and 
undermine global efforts to address cigarette smuggling 
The illicit trade protocol (ITP), a supplementary treaty to the FCTC, 
was adopted in November 2012 and puts technology, via a global track 
and trace system, at the heart of addressing illicit tobacco. It specifies 
clearly that the tobacco industry should play no part in such a system. 
Leaked industry documents show the TTCs had prepared for this by 
secretly developing a plan to promote Codentify, a pack labelling 
system developed and controlled by PMI, as the track and trace 
system of choice. Not only does Codentify not meet the ITP 
requirements for a track and trace system,178 but this would put the 
TTCs in control of a global system seeking to address the illicit tobacco 
trade in which they have been extensively involved. Further, it directly 
contravenes both Article 5.3 and the ITP’s requirement for the system 
to be independent of industry. 
In 2011 the four TTCs collectively established the Digital Coding and 
Tracking Association (DCTA) in Switzerland to collaborate with 
governments and international organisations and promote Codentify, 
and PMI alone donated Euro15 million to INTERPOL, the world’s largest 
police organisation. By July 2012, DCTA had begun working with 
INTERPOL to make Codentify accessible to law enforcement agencies 
globally via INTERPOL’s Global Register. Subsequent to the donation, 
Interpol controversially applied for Observer Status at the November 
2012 Conference of the Parties claiming its ability to coordinate and 
facilitate international cooperation to eliminate illicit trade would be an 
asset.154,164 
In 2014, the industry’s DCTA was a major sponsor of the World 
Customs Organisation conference on illicit tobacco in Brisbane, 
Australia. KPMG’s Robin Cartwright presented in DCTA’s timeslot but 
his presentation did not mention that he is leading a £10million project 
on behalf of PMI.154,179 Simultaneously, KPMG and GS1 UK launched a 
new report promoting Codentify.180 While this report acknowledges 
that KPMG has worked for the tobacco industry and cites funding from 
DCTA, it fails to note that DCTA is effectively the tobacco industry. 
As part of their apparent efforts to further ingratiate themselves with 
the international law enforcement community, in 2011 PMI donated 
55,000Euros to the International Anti- Corruption Academy,181 an 
organisation initiated by the European Antifraud Office (OLAF) and the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)182 to provide anti-corruption 
education and research. 
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Tobacco companies have worked assiduously to achieve this 
position by taking advantage of the complexity of the issue and using 
their resource advantage to dominate every aspect of the debate. 
First, by commissioning reports and surveys, tobacco companies have 
come to control the data and evidence on illicit and use this to 
dominate media coverage, secure access to authorities and promote 
industry messaging on illicit,161–163 for example that illicit is driven by 
public health policies rather than weaknesses in customs and law 
enforcement and that counterfeiting and intellectual property crime are 
the primary concerns.164 The volume of industry reports of this nature 
produced in recent years has been overwhelming, making it impossible 
for tobacco control groups to adequately respond. Where industry 
evidence and data from Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Australia have been examined, they have been found to be seriously 
flawed, to significantly exaggerate the scale of illicit (and the 
counterfeit element) and underplay industry involvement.154,161,163,165–
170 
Second, tobacco companies fund activities under the umbrella of 
CSR (training for border patrol and customs officials, funding for sniffer 
dogs171–173) to further cement access and signal the need for 
“partnership” between industry and authorities. These activities have 
enjoyed success as far afield as Azerbaijan, Mali, Namibia, South 
Africa, as well as at supranational level (Box 4).174 Consequently 
tobacco companies are now cooperating, both formally and informally, 
with various governments and intergovernmental agencies, contrary to 
Article 5.3. Alongside extensive CSR efforts (see above) and claimed 
commitments to harm reduction (which have hitherto largely featured 
in HICs10,11), such efforts are undoubtedly intended to counter the 
TTCs’ gradual exclusion from the policy arena and undermine Article 
5.3. More worryingly, if the norm of cooperation the industry is 
seeking to establish in illicit trade seeps over into other areas of policy, 
it threatens tobacco control more generally.175 
Third, tobacco companies have been funding a growing number 
of third parties – organisations and individuals (notably ex-policemen) 
- who provide credibility and are deliberately used as ‘media 
messengers’ or report authors, their links to industry rarely 
disclosed.176 The 2014 report produced by KPMG for the tobacco 
industry’s Digital Coding and Tracking Association (Box 4) and ITIC’s 
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activities (see above) are just recent examples. Press coverage 
frequently fails to expose industry backing for these reports or their 
inaccuracy.162 
Collectively such efforts are enjoying considerable success and 
should be seen as part of the industry’s audacious attempt to secure 
control over the Illicit Trade Protocol and ensure it is put in charge of 
the global track and trace system that the protocol envisages as 
addressing global cigarette smuggling (Box 4). Yet the danger of 
regulatory capture with the industry coming to control both the data 
on and how the illicit trade is dealt with is illustrated by the legally 
binding deals reached between the four TTCs and the European 
Commission, which growing evidence suggests have failed. While data 
show that genuine tobacco industry products are still being smuggled 
in significant volumes in the EU, the payments TTCs have had to make 
have been so tiny as to provide no effective disincentive.156,177 If a 
legally binding deal in a well-resourced jurisdiction has failed, this 
raises major concerns about the deals, binding and voluntary, 
negotiated elsewhere. As experts note, no deal with the tobacco 
industry has ever led to a positive outcome for public health.174 
The Way Forward 
Addressing tobacco industry interference should be simple. FCTC 
Article 5.3 guidelines outline the measures needed,7 technical reports 
flesh these out in detail,183–186 while this paper shows that industry 
tactics are repeated over time and place and could therefore be 
predicted and countered.34 Yet, while growing numbers of countries 
have taken steps to prevent tobacco industry interference, successful 
implementation of Article 5.3 is almost non-existent.174 
In practice, countering tobacco industry influence is complex. 
Even[0] where efforts have been made to implement Article 5.3, 
tobacco companies offset such efforts by expanding their use of third 
parties, changing the regulatory architecture in a way that cements 
corporate access and influence12,13,187,188 and influencing economic 
agreements to enable them to challenge policies.117 Tobacco 
companies will continue to secure access and influence as long as it 
remains acceptable to do so. A necessary first step, therefore, and a 
pre-requisite to advancing tobacco control, is to change attitudes to 
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the tobacco industry. This requires civil society to actively monitor and 
publicise industry misconduct (as detailed in Article 5.3) and for 
ministries of health to help disseminate these findings within 
government and beyond. As tobacco companies spend millions each 
year attempting to rehabilitate their image189–192 and as institutional 
memories are short, such efforts must be ongoing. It is no coincidence 
that the countries (in all income groups) with the most successful 
tobacco control policies also have the most active programmes of 
industry monitoring (witness Thailand, Brazil, UK, Australia)14,193 and 
that recent progress in others has come in part though recognition of 
industry malfeasance and efforts to implement 5.3 (Box 5). While such 
efforts currently focus at the national level, industry influence also 
increasingly occurs at supranational level (the deals with INTERPOL, 
lobbying by ITIC and regional business organisations, for example). To 
address this, parties to the FCTC must cooperate, share knowledge, 
raise awareness among and hold intergovernmental agencies to 
account, and ensure that industry activity beyond national boundaries 
is monitored and reported. While WHO has a mandate to monitor the 
industry’s supranational activity, funding for such efforts would need to 
be met by member states or international NGOs. Finally, TTCs’ HIC 
host governments should play a more active role in holding TTCs to 
account. In contrast to Switzerland (now home to two TTCs, PMI and 
Japan Tobacco International), the UK government (home to BAT and 
Imperial Tobacco) has made a start in developing guidelines for 
diplomatic posts.194 
Box 5 
Progress in the Philippines 
In January 2013, after a hard-fought political battle against the 
tobacco industry (led by PMI) and its allies, and following active efforts 
to implement Article 5.3,183 the Philippines government implemented a 
major reform of tobacco excise tax structure and rates including 
hypothecating the tax for health purposes. The reform sought to 
eventually eliminate a structure that favoured incumbent firms and 
kept taxes and therefore prices of tobacco products low. Though the 
country has long endured a reputation for poor governance and 
corruption195,196, governments can change. In this case, there was 
strong overt support for the reform from the highest political levels, 
including the President, the finance minister, the commissioner of the 
revenue authority and the leaders in both houses of the national 
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legislature197,198 More importantly for countries seeking to replicate this 
success, the government successfully linked the reform strongly to 
health, both in terms of mitigating tobacco use but also by earmarking 
hypothecating the vast proportion of new revenues to providing 
universal health coverage to the country’s most vulnerable 
populations. These linkages engendered widespread legislative and 
public support, which ensured the reform’s success. As of mid-2014, 
early estimates suggest that tax revenues have increased and are 
going to the earmarked hypothecated programs, and smoking 
prevalence among the young and those of lower income are now 
declining.199,200 
This approach does not overlook the fact that industry influence 
is a manifestation of the inequalities in power and resources between 
TTCs on one hand, and nation states and civil society on the other. 
This is particularly the case in LMICs. Instead it recognises that this 
resource imbalance can only be directly addressed through radical 
measures that curtail the tobacco industry’s excess profits19 or 
fundamentally alter its structure.201 The difficulties countries face in 
implementing even simple tobacco control policies underline that these 
more radical ‘endgame’ solutions, while much needed, are unlikely to 
be achieved without first changing attitudes to the industry through 
the actions above. 
Yet, while the ability of tobacco control policies to rapidly reduce 
non-communicable diseases in LMICs is widely recognised, the political 
complexities of implementing such measures are overlooked.9 The 
Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use are 
exceptional in recognising this problem and supporting policy advocacy 
for tobacco control, including efforts to address tobacco industry 
interference. However, until this need is more widely recognised and 
tobacco control embedded more firmly in the development agenda, 
progress will remain slow. Economies of scale can be realised by 
collectively addressing the corporate vectors of NCDs, including 
tobacco, alcohol, processed food and sugary drinks, and the shared 
mechanisms (eg international economic agreements) though which 
their influence is mediated.202,203 Governments should also look to, 
polluter pays principles, hypothecated taxes or price regulation19 to 
fund these efforts. 
Governments and civil society must also look to implement 
other elements of Article 5.3 (including limiting interactions with 
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industry and ensuring their transparency, rejecting partnerships with 
industry, avoiding conflicts of interest for officials, denormalising 
activities industry describes as “socially responsible”). Most ministries 
of health are now cognisant of tobacco industry misconduct and the 
requirements of 5.3 and can therefore play a key role in informing 
other government departments. While departments seeking to control 
illicit tobacco may need to meet with and obtain data from the tobacco 
industry, they should ensure such interactions meet the standards of 
transparency required of Article 5.3 and learn to treat industry data 
with scepticism. Similarly civil society and ministries of health must 
urge governments to reverse any agreements tobacco companies have 
hitherto secured with governments. Prospectively, progress on Article 
5.3 is likely to be enabled by first implementing the most feasible 
measures. For example, many countries have codes of conduct for civil 
service to which guidance for interaction with the tobacco industry 
could be added and provisions consistent with 5.3 can be added to 
tobacco control legislation as it is being developed. More broadly, 
improving standards of governance and transparency in policing 
making and public life and ensuring greater public health involvement 
in trade and investment agreement negotiations would help. 
Beyond this, a number of specific technical interventions should 
help address industry interference in LMICs and beyond. Technical 
support and capacity building is needed to enable parties to deal with 
legal challenges to tobacco control via both domestic courts and 
international dispute settlement mechanisms and is being addressed 
via the relevant knowledge hubs.204 Investigative research and 
capacity building in illicit tobacco is needed to further understand and 
address this complex issue. Updated research that directly addresses 
industry economic arguments, including those on tobacco farming, is 
also needed alongside efforts to accelerate the development of FCTC 
Article 17 and 18 guidelines on support for economically viable 
alternative alternatives to tobacco. Moving forward, LMICs must guard 
against industry efforts to alter the regulatory architecture, for 
example through the application of Better Regulation principles and 
business impact assessments, which have been shown to embed and 
enable corporate influence.12,13,188 
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Conclusion 
Tobacco industry interference with governments’ efforts to 
implement tobacco control policies remains one of the greatest 
challenges to preventing the harm caused by this industry. Tobacco 
companies continue to promote their lethal product and circumvent or 
prevent development and implementation of effective tobacco control 
policies. While select countries in all income groups, including those 
where the industry is a significant economic player,193 show that 
actively addressing tobacco industry misconduct is achievable and 
enables effective tobacco control, elsewhere, despite a legal obligation 
to implement the FCTC, progress is lamentably slow and an epidemic 
that could be prevented continues to escalate. While debate centres on 
whether progress can be most rapidly achieved through 
implementation of FCTC provisions or moving to more radical 
‘endgame’ solutions, actively addressing tobacco industry interference 
is a pre-requisite to both. Changing attitudes to the tobacco industry 
through actively monitoring and exposing its conduct is an essential 
first step. 
 5 key points panel 
 The tobacco industry’s future depends on increasing tobacco use in 
low and middle income countries (LMICs), especially among women 
and youth and contrary to industry claims, tobacco marketing 
deliberately targets these groups. High levels of marketing are 
documented in LMICs. 
 Tobacco companies consistently contest and seek to circumvent 
governments’ authority to implement public health measures using 
highly misleading arguments frequently presented via third parties 
whose links to industry are obscured. 
 In LMICs, tobacco companies harness their resource advantages in 
establishing partnerships with governments to address the trade in 
illicit tobacco in which there is evidence of their complicity and in 
using the threat of domestic litigation and arbitration under 
economic agreements (rarely drawing on the original intent of 
these agreements) to intimidate governments against 
comprehensive tobacco control measures. 
 Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and 
its guidelines offer governments a set of strategies to protect 
public health against the tobacco industry’s appalling conduct, but 
are underutilised. 
 An essential first step in addressing tobacco industry interference is 
changing attitudes to the industry through actively monitoring and 
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exposing its conduct. Exemplar countries show that such efforts 
underpin the development of effective tobacco control. 
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Supplementary Material 
Web appendix 
Table w1: The global tobacco industry (2013 data)  
Company % share world 
cigarette volume  
Leading brands 
Chinese National Tobacco Company 
(CNTC) 
43.2% Hongtashan, BaiSham Red Dragon, Shuangxi, 
Hongqiqu, Huangguoshu, Hongmei 
Philip Morris International (PMI) 14.3% Marlboro, L&M, Bond Street, Philip Morris, 
Parliament Virginia Slims 
British American Tobacco (BAT) 11.6% Pall Mall, Kent, Dunhill, Derby, Lucky Strike, 
Kent, Vogue 
Japan Tobacco International (JTI) 9.4% Winston, Mild Seven, Camel, L&D 
Imperial Tobacco 4.9% Gauloises, Davidoff, West, JPS, Marquise, 
Fortuna, Ducados, Lambert and Butler 
Main private companies  in US 
market: Altria, Reynolds American, 
Lorillard*, Liggett Vector Brands  
4.5% - n/a  
Other private companies outside 
US**(most co-owned by one of the 
TTCs) 
5.7% n/a 
State run companies+ other than 
CNTC 
3% n/a 
Private label (supermarkets’ own 
brand tobacco) 
0.1% n/a 
Others (companies with less than 
0.1% global market share) 
3.4% n/a 
Source: Euromonitor 1 
*In July 2014 Lorillard and Reynolds American (RAI) entered into an agreement in 
which RAI agreed to acquire Lorillard. As part of this acquisition Imperial Tobacco will 
acquire Lorillard’s Maverick cigarette brand and e-cigarette brand Blu, and will also 
acquire RAI’s cigarette brands KOOL, Salem and Winston.  
** ITC (India), Gudang Garam (Indonesia), KT&G (South Korea), Djarum PT 
(Indonesia), Donskoy Tabak (Russia), Neman Tobacco Factory Grodno (Belarus), 
Nojorono Tobacco Indonesia PT, Mighty Corp (Philippines), Godfrey Phillips India Ltd, 
VST Industries Ltd (India), Adris Grupa dd (Croatia), Bulgartabac Holding AD 
(Bulgaria).  
+ Vietnam National Tobacco Corp, Eastern Co SAE (Egypt), Thailand Tobacco 
Company, Société Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes (Algeria), Iranian Tobacco Co, 
Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor Corporation, and Régie Nationale des Tabacs et des 
Allumettes (Tunisia) 
 
Web Box 1: The ways in cigarette smuggling can benefit the 
tobacco industry and evidence of industry complicity 
It is important to note that tobacco companies make their profit when they sell to 
the distributor and whether the cigarettes are then sold through legal or illegal 
channels makes little difference. However, sale through illegal channels has a 
number of advantages for the industry (as well as obvious risks): 
1. It bypasses tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and thereby gets cigarettes into 
otherwise closed or protected markets, a key market entry technique that tobacco 
companies have used extensively in the past.  
2. Smuggled cigarettes either have no excise duties on them or duties from a lower 
tax jurisdiction meaning they are sold more cheaply than they should. This means 
more sales, particularly to the young and the poor who are the most price-sensitive. 
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3. Despite evidence of involvement in the illicit trade, tobacco companies have used 
it  to shape policy in their own interest by arguing that demand for the illicit 
product, rather than its supply drives the problem. For example, in countries where 
they want to invest, they argued that the presence of illicit signals a need for 
foreign investment (rather than the involvement of the potential foreign investors). 
Elsewhere, they argued that illicit is driven by high taxes and will fall if they are 
reduced. 
Through the 1990s overwhelming evidence emerged that cigarette smuggling was a 
core part of tobacco industry business, actively used on a global basis. This 
prompted investigations and lawsuits and it had generally been assumed that 
industry involvement in the trade had ceased. Emerging evidence suggests this may 
not be the case and that, while the way in which industry cigarettes are smuggled 
may have changed, some degree of complicity continues and at the very least 
tobacco companies continue to overproduce or over-supply cigarettes in the 
apparent knowledge they will leak into the illicit market. 
Sources: 2-28 
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